Hashing with matrices refers to a simple idea of using a pair of matrices, A and B (over a finite ring), to hash the "0" and "1" bit, respectively, and then to hash an arbitrary bit string in the natural way, by using multiplication of matrices. Since there are many known pairs of 2 × 2 matrices over Z that generate a free monoid, this yields numerous pairs of matrices over F p , for sufficiently large primes p, that are candidates for collision-resistant hashing. However, this trick can "backfire", and lifting matrix entries to Z may facilitate finding a collision or even finding a preimage.
INTRODUCTION
Hash functions are easy-to-compute compression functions that take a variablelength input and convert it to a fixed-length output. Hash functions are used as compact representations, or digital fingerprints, of data and to provide message integrity. Basic requirements are well known:
(1) Preimage resistance (sometimes called non-invertibility): it should be computationally infeasible to find an input which hashes to a specified output; (2) Second pre-image resistance: it should be computationally infeasible to find a second input that hashes to the same output as a specified input; (3) Collision resistance: it should be computationally infeasible to find two different inputs that hash to the same output. A challenging problem is to determine mathematical properties of a hash function that would ensure (or at least, make it likely) that the requirements above are met.
Early suggestions (especially the SHA family) did not really use any mathematical ideas apart from the Merkle-Damgard construction for producing collisionresistant hash functions from collision-resistant compression functions (see e.g. [6] ); the main idea was just to "create a mess" by using complex iterations (this is not meant in a derogatory sense, but just as an opposite of using mathematical structure one way or another).
An interesting direction worth mentioning is constructing hash functions that are provably as secure as underlying assumptions, e.g. as discrete logarithm assumptions; see [2] and references therein. These hash functions however tend to be not very efficient. For a general survey on hash functions we refer to [6] .
Another direction, relevant to the present paper, is using a pair of elements, A and B, of a semigroup S, such that the Cayley graph of the semigroup generated by A and B is expander. Probably the most popular implementation of this idea so far is the Tillich-Zémor hash function [11] .
The Tillich-Zémor hash function, unlike functions in the SHA family, is not a block hash function, i.e., each bit is hashed individually. More specifically, the "0" bit is hashed to a particular 2 × 2 matrix A, and the "1" bit is hashed to another 2 × 2 matrix B. Then a bit string is hashed simply to the product of matrices A and B corresponding to bits in this string. For example, the bit string 1000110 is hashed to the matrix BA 3 B 2 A.
Tillich and Zémor use matrices A, B from the group SL 2 (R), where R is a commutative ring (actually, a field) defined as R = F 2 [x]/(p(x)). Here F 2 is the field with two elements, F 2 [x] is the ring of polynomials over F 2 , and (p(x)) is the ideal of F 2 [x] generated by an irreducible polynomial p(x) of degree n (typically, n is a prime, 127 ≤ n ≤ 170); for example, p(
) is isomorphic to F 2 n , the field with 2 n elements.
Then, the matrices A and B are:
where α is a root of p(x). Another idea of the same kind is to use a pair of 2 × 2 matrices, A and B, over Z that generate a free monoid, and then reduce the entries modulo a large prime p to get matrices over F p . Since there cannot be an equality of two different products of positive powers of A and B unless at least one of the entries in at least one of the products is ≥ p, this gives a lower bound on the minimum length of bit strings where a collision may occur. This lower bound is going to be on the order of log p; we give more precise bounds for some particular examples of A and B in our Section ??.
The first example of a pair of matrices over Z that generate a free monoid is:
) .
These matrices are obviously invertible, so they actually generate the whole group SL 2 (Z). This group is not free, but the monoid generated by A(1) and B(1) is free, and this is what matters for hashing because only positive powers of A(1) and B(1) occur in hashing. However, the fact that these two matrices generate the whole group SL 2 (Z) yields an attack on the corresponding hash function (where the matrices A(1) and B(1) are considered over F p , for a large p), see [10] , where a collision is found by using Euclidean algorithm on the entries of a matrix.
At this point, we note that a pair of matrices
In Section 2, we consider the following pair of matrices:
By using a result from an old paper of Sanov [9] and combining it with the attack on hashing with A(1) and B(1) offered in [10] , we show that there is an efficient heuristic algorithm that finds circuits of length O(log p) in the Cayley graph of the group generated by A(2) and B(2), considered as matrices over F p . However, this has no bearing on the security of the hash function based on A(2) and B(2) since in hashing only positive powers of A(2) and B(2) are used, and group relations of length O(log p) produced by the mentioned algorithm will involve negative as well as positive powers with overwhelming probability
HASHING WITH A(2) AND B(2) AND CIRCUITS IN THE CAYLEY GRAPH
In this section, motivated by hashing with the matrices A(2) and B(2) considered as matrices over F p , we discuss circuits in the relevant Cayley graph.
Tillich and Zémor [10] offered an attack on the hash function based on A(1) and B(1) (again, considered as matrices over F p ). To the best of our knowledge, this is the only published attack on that hash function. In this section we explain why this particular attack should not work with the matrices A(2) and B (2) , and this therefore leaves the door open for using these matrices (over F p , for a sufficiently large p) for hashing.
First we explain, informally, what appears to be the reason why the attack from [10] should not work with A(2) and B (2) . The reason basically is that, while A(1) and B(1) (considered over Z) generate (as a monoid!) the whole monoid of 2 × 2 matrices over Z with positive entries, with the matrices A(2) and B(2) the situation is much less transparent. There is a result from an old paper by Sanov [9] that says: the subgroup of SL 2 (Z) generated by A(2) and B (2) consists of all matrices of the form
, where all m i are arbitrary integers. This, however, does not tell much about the monoid generated by A(2) and B (2) . In fact, a generic matrix of the above form would not belong to this monoid. This is not surprising because: (1) A(2) and B(2) generate a free group, by another result of Sanov [9] ;
(2) the number of different elements represented by all freely irreducible words in A(2) and B(2) of length m ≥ 2 is 4 ·3 m−1 , whereas the number of different elements represented by positive words of length m ≥ 2 is 2 m . Thus, the share of matrices in the above form representable by positive words in A(2) and B(2) is exponentially negligible. What Tillich and Zémor's "lifting attack" [10] can still give is an efficient heuristic algorithm that finds relations of length O(log p) in the group generated by A (2) and B(2), considered as matrices over F p . We describe this algorithm below because we believe it might be useful in other contexts, although it has no bearing on the security of the hash function based on A(2) and B(2) since in hashing only positive powers of A(2) and B(2) are used, and group relations of length O(log p) produced by the algorithm mentioned above will involve negative as well as positive powers with overwhelming probability, even if p is rather small.
We are now going to use a combination of the attack on A(1) and B(1) offered in [10] with a aforementioned result of Sanov [9] . Theorem 1. There is an efficient heuristic algorithm that finds particular relations of the form w (A(2) , B(2)) = 1, where w is a group word of length O(log p), and the matrices A(2) and B(2) are considered over F p .
Proof. It was shown in [10] that: (a) For any prime p, there is an efficient heuristic algorithm that finds positive integers k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 such that the matrix
has determinant 1 and all k i are of about the same magnitude O(p 2 ).
(b) A generic matrix from part (a) has an efficient factorization (in SL 2 (Z)) in a product of positive powers of A(1) and B(1), of length O(log p). (This obviously yields a collision in SL 2 (F p ) since the matrix from part (a) equals the identity matrix in SL 2 (F p ).)
Now we combine these results with the aforementioned result of Sanov the following way. We are going to multiply a matrix from (a) (call it M) by a matrix from SL 2 (Z) (call it S) with very small (between 0 and 5 by the absolute value) entries, so that the resulting matrix M · S has the form as in Sanov's result. Since the matrix M, by the Tillich-Zémor results, has an efficient factorization (in SL 2 (Z)) in a product w (A(1), B(1) ) of positive powers of A(1) and B(1) of length O(log p), the same holds for the matrix M · S. Then, since the matrix M · S is in "Sanov's form", we know that it is, in fact, a product of powers of A(2) and B (2) . Now we need one more ingredient to efficiently re-write a product of A(1) and B(1) into a product of A(2) and B(2) without blowing up the length too much. This procedure is provided by Theorem 2.3.10 in [3] . We cannot explain it without introducing a lot of background material, but the fact is that, since the group SL 2 (Z) is hyperbolic (whatever that means) and the subgroup generated by A(2) and B (2) is quasiconvex (whatever that means), there is a quadratic time algorithm (in the length of the word w (A(1), B(1)) ) that re-writes w (A(1), B(1) ) into a u(A(2), B (2) ) such that w(A(1), B(1)) = u(A(2), B (2) ) and the length of u is bounded by a constant (independent of w) times the length of w.
Thus, what is now left to complete the proof is to exhibit, for all possible matrices M as in part (a) above, particular "small" matrices S such that M · S is in "Sanov's form". We are therefore going to consider many different cases corresponding to possible combinations of residues modulo 4 of the entries of the matrix M (recall that M has to have determinant 1), and in each case we are going to exhibit the corresponding matrix S such that M · S is in "Sanov's form". Denote bŷ M the matrix of residues modulo 4 of the entries of M. Since the total number of cases is too large, we consider matricesM "up to a symmetry".
This completes the proof.
To conclude this section, we point out an example of re-writing a word in A(1) and B(1) into a word in A(2) and B(2):
We see that even in this simple example, both positive and negative powers of A (2) and B(2) are required.
GIRTH OF THE CAYLEY GRAPH RELEVANT TO A(k) AND B(k)
Our starting point here is the following observation: the entries of matrices that are products of length n of positive powers of A(k) and B(k) exhibit the fastest growth (as functions of n) if A(k) and B(k) alternate in the product: A(k)B(k)A(k)B(k) · · · . More formally: Proposition 1. Let w n (a, b) be an arbitrary positive word of even length n, and let W n = w n (A(k), B(k)), with k ≥ 2. Let C n = (A(k) · B(k)) n 2 . Then: (a) the sum of entries in any row of C n is at least as large as the sum of entries in any row of W n ; (b) the largest entry of C n is at least as large as the largest entry of W n .
Proof. First note that multiplying a matrix X by A(k) on the right amounts to adding to the second column of X the first column multiplied by k. Similarly, multiplying X by B(k) on the right amounts to adding to the first column of X the second column multiplied by k. This means, in particular, that when we build a word in A(k) and B(k) going left to right, elements of the first row change independently of elements of the second row. Therefore, we can limit our considerations to pairs of positive integers, and the result will follow from the following Proof. We are going to prove (a) and (b) simultaneously using induction by the length of a sequence of transformations. Suppose our lemma holds for all sequences of length at most m ≥ 2, with the same initial pair (x, y). Suppose the final pair after m alternating transformations is (X,Y ). Without loss of generality, assume that X < Y . That means the last applied transformation was R. Now applying L to (X,Y ) gives (X + kY,Y ), while applying R to (X,Y ) gives (X,Y + kX). Since X + kY > Y + kX, applying L results in a larger sum of elements as well as in a larger maximum element. Thus, we have a sequence of (m + 1) alternating transformations, and now we have to consider one more case.
Suppose some sequence of m transformations applied to (x, y) results in a pair
Then applying L to this pair gives (X ′ + kY ′ ,Y ′ ), and the sum is
This completes the proof of the lemma and the proposition.
This motivates us to consider powers of the matrix C(k) = A(k)B(k) to get to entries larger than p "as quickly as possible". A(2)B(2) . The matrix C(2) is
Powers of C(2) =
) . If we denote (C(2)) n = ( a n b n c n d n )
, then the following recurrence relations are easily proved by induction on n: a n = 5a n−1 + 2b n−1 ; b n = c n = 2a n−1 + b n−1 ; d n = a n−1 . Combining the recurrence relations for a n and b n , we get 2b n = a n − a n−1 , so 2b n−1 = a n−1 − a n−2 . Plugging this into the displayed recurrence relation for a n gives a n = 6a n−1 − a n−2 . Similarly, we get b n = 6b n−1 − b n−2 . Solving these recurrence relations (with appropriate initial conditions), we get a n = (
Thus, a n is the largest entry of (C(2)) n , and we conclude that no entry of (C(2)) n is larger than p as long as n < log 3+ √ 8 p. Since C(2) = A(2)B(2) is a product of two generators, (C(2)) n has length 2n as a word in the generators A(2) and B (2) . Therefore, no two positive words of length ≤ m in the generators A(2) and B(2) (considered as matrices over F p ) can be equal as long as 
